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PROPERTY LAW
I.

TWENTY YEARS OF PUBLIC USE No LONGER REQUIRED TO EVIDENCE
PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF PROPERTY OFFERED By DEDICATION

In Boyd v. Hyatt1 the South Carolina Court of Appeals clarified
the state of the law concerning time required for accepting an offer of

dedication by public use. This case involved a dispute which arose over
the right of ingress and egress across a paved strip twenty-five feet
wide running in front of the parties' stores. The trial court determined

the strip had been offered for public dedication and that the public
had accepted a right of way across the property. 2 Hyatt appealed the
lower court's decision, arguing that the holding of the South Carolina
Supreme Court in Turnbull v. Rivers8 required that public use must
continue for twenty years before the public could accept an offer of
4
dedication.

In Turnbull the plaintiff claimed an easement over the defendant's land based on theories of necessity, prescription and presumption
of grant. The court determined the plaintiff had no right to a private
easement by reason of prescription or presumption of grant because he
did not prove uninterrupted use for twenty years. The case did not
discuss dedication by public use.5
In Kirkland v. Gross,6 however, the South Carolina Court of Appeals stated that "[a]cceptance of a dedication is evidenced 'either by
general public use or by the acts of the public authorities.' ''7 The court
further required that "such use must be uninterrupted for at least
twenty years." 8 The Kirland court relied on Turnbull as authority for
its conclusion. 9 The effect of this decision was to create confusion over
the length of time public use must continue to effectuate an acceptance
of an offer for public dedication.
In Boyd the court of appeals addressed the confusion created by

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

294 S.C. 360, 364 S.E.2d 478 (Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 363, 364 S.E.2d at 480.
14 S.C.L. (3 McCord) 131, 133 (1825).
Boyd, 294 S.C. at 366, 364 S.E.2d at 481.
See Turnbull, 14 S.C.L. (3 McCord) at 133.

6. 286 S.C. 193, 332 S.E.2d 546 (Ct. App. 1985).

7. Id. at 199, 332 S.E.2d at 549 (quoting Outlaw v. Moise, 222 S.C. 24, 31, 71
S.E.2d 509, 512 (1952)).

8. Id.
9. See id.
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Kirkland and attempted to clarify the law on this issue. The court reviewed the holding in Turnbull, noting that the plaintiffs in that case
relied on necessity, prescription and presumption of grant. It concluded that the Turnbull decision did not address the issue of dedication by public use. The court further concluded that its earlier reliance
in Kirkland on the Turnbull decision was misplaced because of the
distinction between dedication and a private easement created by
prescription. 0
Recognizing the confusion concerning the time required to accept
an offer of dedication by public use, the Boyd court attempted to clarify the time period by providing the following rule:
Where there ha[s] been an intended dedication by the owner of property, no specific duration of use by the public is required to show acceptance. The sufficiency of the use depends upon the circumstances
of each case. There must, however, be public use for a sufficient period of time as will indicate the intention of the public to accept the
offer of dedication.11
Applying this rule, the Boyd court concluded that use of a road for
thirteen years was sufficient to evidence the public's intention of
acceptance.12
The holding in Boyd indicates that public use can constitute acceptance of an offer of dedication and that the use does not have to
continue for twenty years or more. The decision, however, provides the
practitioner or property owner with little aid in trying to determine
when public use has continued for a sufficient period of time to constitute an "intention of the public to accept the offer of dedication."'"
A basic premise evidenced by the case law of other jurisdictions is
that an intention of the public to accept an offer of dedication is found
when use has continued for a sufficient length of time so that public
accommodation or private rights might be materially affected by an
interruption in the enjoyment. 4 If public use has continued for such a

10. Boyd, 294 S.C. at 366 n.2, 364 S.E.2d at 481 n.2.
11. Id. at 366, 364 S.E.2d at 481.
12. Id.
13. See id. The court of appeals provided only that the public must show an inten-

tion to accept an offer of dedication. The court did not provide a test by which to determine such intent. With regard to a practitioner or property owner's concern as to what
can be done with land in question, this holding creates uncertainty as to the status of
land that may have been offered, expressly or impliedly, to the public for dedication.
Other South Carolina cases fail to establish any such test as well. Guidelines, therefore,
should be drawn from decisions in other jurisdictions.
14. See, e.g., Chatham Motorcycle Club, Inc. v. Blount, 214 Ga. 770, 774-75, 107
S.E.2d 806, 810 (1959); Lowry v. Rosenfeld, 213 Ga. 60, 63, 96 S.E.2d 581, 584-85 (1957);
Hudspeth v. County of Early, 210 Ga. 386, 392, 80 S.E.2d 185, 189 (1954); Maddox v.
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period of time as to render its reclamation unjust and improper, the
dedication is complete.", At least one jurisdiction apparently regards
the character of the use as more important than the length of the use.18
Furthermore, acceptance of an intended offer of dedication is complete
when the public has used the land in question for a sufficient period of
time to indicate that it is acting on the basis of a claimed right resulting from the dedicatory acts of the owner.1"
The characteristics or nature of the property offered for public
dedication, along with the purpose for which it was offered, often provide an additional guideline for determining the length of time required for acceptance by public use. Mere use may not be sufficient,
since the use must comport with the purpose of the dedication and
must be accompanied by acts that evidence this use. 8 Furthermore,
courts often rely on the beneficial nature of the dedication is often relied on in estimating the length of time required to accept the offer.
The more beneficial and convenient the use by the public, the shorter
the time required to imply an acceptance. 9
While statutes relating to public use often provide guidelines for
the time required to infer an offer of dedication as a result of public
use, the statutes rarely provide limits on the time required for an acceptance by public use once an offer has been made. Some courts, however, may look to the statutory time periods in determining a reasonable time period for public acceptance. 0
The clear import of the Boyd decision is its rule that through public use, the public may accept an offer of dedication in less than twenty
years if the use is for a sufficient period of time to indicate an intent to

Willis, 205 Ga. 596, 597, 54 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1949).
15. Greenco Corp. v. City of Va. Beach, 214 Va. 201, 204, 198 S.E.2d 496, 498-99

(1973).
16. See Smith v. Gwinnett County, 248 Ga. 882, 885, 286 S.E.2d 739, 742 (1982);
Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 154, 160, 282 S.E.2d 76, 82 (1981).
17. E.g., Gwinnett County, 248 Ga. at 885, 286 S.E.2d at 742; Smith, 248 Ga. at
160, 282 S.E.2d at 82.

18. See 26 C.J.S. Dedication § 37(a) (1956). The pertinent part of this section
reads:
[Sufficiency of use to establish an] intention to accept will depend in a measure
on the character of the property dedicated; and where from its nature it might

be extensively used, greater use will be required to show an acceptance ....
[The use must be by] the general public, and not as neighbors, or under an

easement, or otherwise in their individual capacity ....
...[The acceptance of the offer of dedication may require only evidence]
that those who would naturally be expected to enjoy [the property] do, or have

done so, at their pleasure and convenience.
Id.
19. 23 Ari. JUR. 2D Dedication § 55 (1983).
20. See C.J.S. Dedication § 37(b) (1956).
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accept. When looking for evidence of such intent, courts may be expected to consider the following factors: the effect on the public if the
use is discontinued; the nature and the benefit of the use to the public;
the existence of an expressed public claim to the property resulting
from dedicatory acts of the owner; the comportment of the use with
the purpose for which the property was dedicated; and any statutory
guidelines that imply a reasonable time for acceptance by use.
Bernard F. Hawkins, Jr.

II.

MISTAKEN BELIEF AS TO OWNERSHIP OF TRACT OF LAND HELD

SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY HOSTILITY ELEMENT OF ADVERSE POSSESSION

In Wigfall v. Fobbs21 the South Carolina Supreme Court clarified
whether mistaken belief as to the ownership of a tract of land satisfies
the hostility requirement for adverse possession. South Carolina courts
previously had ruled that in boundary dispute cases in which one landowner mistakenly encroached onto another's land, the mistaken belief
was not hostile, thereby precluding adverse possession.22 With the
Wigfall decision, the supreme court refused to apply this rule to land
tract disputes 23 and opened the door
for questioning application of the
24
rule to boundary disputes as well.
The case arose between the respondents, three sisters, who
claimed legal title to two tracts of land, and the Fobbses, who alleged
they acquired title to the land through adverse possession. To prove
adverse possession, the Fobbses claimed they had farmed and possessed the tract for more than seventy years. They paid taxes on the
land, built houses, granted a right of way, and deeded portions of the
land to various family members. Despite this evidence, the master-inequity concluded the Fobbses had failed to meet their burden of proof
because they did not show their possession was hostile.25
In denying the Fobbses' claim, the master reasoned that "[s]ince
their possession was based on a mistaken belief of ownership

. . .

they

lacked the intention to dispossess the true owner, and therefore, their

21. 295 S.C. 59, 367 S.E.2d 156 (1988).
22. See, e.g., Brown v. Clemens, 287 S.C. 328, 338 S.E.2d 338 (1985).
23.
24.
Fobbses'
mistaken
not need
25.

Wigfall, 295 S.C. at 62, 367 S.E.2d at 157.
See id. at 62 n.1, 367 S.E.2d at 157 n.1 (court noting that it granted the
petition to argue against authority precluding adverse possession in cases of
encroachment, but that because those cases were inapplicable, the court did
to reconsider them).
Id. at 61, 367 S.E.2d at 157.
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possession was not hostile."2 The master also based his conclusion on
testimony that the Fobbses were actually renting the land.2 7 The supreme court reversed in part the lower court's decision and held that
the previous South Carolina rule on mistaken belief in boundary dispute cases was inapplicable to land tract disputes. 2 Furthermore, the
court held that testimony regarding rental of the land should have
been barred by both the rule against hearsay and the South Carolina
Deadman's Statute. 9
By rejecting the mistaken belief rule, the supreme court not only
established a distinct legal standard to be applied in land tract dispute
cases, but also implicitly revealed a possible inclination to follow the
majority rule on adverse possession. The minority rule, which South
Carolina follows with regard to boundary disputes, and which the
master presumed would be followed when tracts of land were at issue,
holds that mistaken belief as to the ownership of a land tract or a
boundary lacks hostile intent, thereby requiring a successful adverse
possessor to intentionally claim land that he knows is not his.30 The
majority rule, however, holds that "any entry and possession for the
required time that is exclusive, continuous, uninterrupted, visible, and
notorious, even though under mistaken claim of title, is sufficient to
support a claim of title by adverse possession.

31

The latter rule re-

wards the person who honestly believes the land is his, instead of
favoring a blatant wrongdoer who intentionally claims someone else's
land.
The Wigfall decision effectively overrules the court of appeals' decision in Lusk v. Callham.3 2 In Lusk the respondent sought title by
adverse possession to a tract of land to which the appellant had record
title. The respondent met all the requirements of adverse possession,
except the element of hostility. The Lusk court stated, "In South Carolina, unlike in most other jurisdictions, possession under a mistaken
belief that property is one's own and with no intent to claim against
the property's true owner cannot constitute hostile possession. ' 33 This

26. Id. In reaching his decision, "the master relied on cases holding the possession

of land by an encroaching landowner beyond the true boundary under a mistaken belief
regarding the location of the boundary is not hostile." Id. (citing Brown, 287 S.C. 328,

338 S.E.2d 338; Lynch v. Lynch, 236 S.C. 612, 115 S.E.2d 301 (1960)).
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 62, 367 S.E.2d at 157-58.
Id., 367 S.E.2d at 157.
Id., 367 S.E.2d at 158.
See Lusk v. Callaham, 287 S.C. 459, 461, 339 S.E.2d 156, 158 (Ct. App. 1986).

31. Id.
32. 287 S.C. 459, 339 S.E.2d 156.
33. Id. at 461, 339 S.E.2d at 158.
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rule, first explicitly established in Ouzts v. McKnight,34 follows a line
of South Carolina cases on boundary disputes. The court of appeals in
Lusk, however, was the first to extend the rule to a land tract dispute
case. The supreme court's failure in Wigfall to follow, or even mention,
the Lusk court's application of the rule to a land tract dispute effectively overrules the court of appeals' decision in Lusk.
In Wig/all the supreme court justified its decision regarding the
hostile possession element on two grounds. First, the court said that
since "this case did not involve a boundary dispute between adjoining
landowners, the rule [that mistaken ownership could not satisfy the
hostility element was] inapplicable. ' 35 Second, the court explicitly
38
stated that it refused to extend the rule to a land tract dispute.
Unfortunately, the supreme court did not reveal its reasons for not
extending the rule, nor did it address whether mistaken ownership
would continue to preclude an adverse possessor from satisfying the
hostility requirement in future boundary dispute cases. Arguably, if
the Wigfall court intended its decision to reward the adverse possessor
who truly believed the land was his, instead of rewarding the presumably inattentive record owner who wished to oust another from his land,
the Wigfall rule should apply to boundary disputes as well. If, however, the supreme court did not intend its decision to reflect policy
concerns, the Wigfall opinion merely establishes a separate legal standard to be applied in land tract disputes.
Since the court failed to elaborate on its reasoning in Wigfall, the
potential impact of this decision is uncertain. Undoubtedly, a new legal
standard for proving the hostility element of adverse possession has
been set for land tract disputes. Whether or not policy concerns for
protecting the honest adverse possessor will place South Carolina in
the majority view regarding boundary disputes remains to be seen.
Virginia C. Tate

III.

COURT FOCUSES ON UNREASONABLE USE TO FIND IMPROPERLY
MAINTAINED DOG PEN CONSTITUTES NUISANCE

In Blanks v. Rawson 37 the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's determination that the odor from a pen containing one dog could be enjoined as a private nuisance per accidens. The
case resulted from a dispute between neighbors who owned adjoining

34. 114 S.C. 303, 103 S.E. 561 (1920).
35. Wigfall, 295 S.C. at 61, 376 S.E.2d at 157.

36. Id.
37. 296 S.C. 110, 370 S.E.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1988).
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residential lots. The plaintiffs, Benjamin and Mary Ann Blanks, alleged Rawson's dog pen was a nuisance. The Blanks complained that
the dog barked and that the dog pen was improperly maintained, causing a foul odor.38
Rawson and the Blanks bought neighboring vacant lots in a highincome residential area. Rawson began building just before the Blanks
started construction and received specific approval from the developer
to locate a dog pen on his lot. The developer informed the Blanks that
Rawson would be their neighbor and they rode by Rawson's previous
residence before building. The only pertinent difference between Rawson's past and present residence was that the dog pen at the previous
residence was located behind the house, and the new pen was located
on the property line between Rawson's and the Blanks' properties. As
the homes were being constructed, the Blanks complained about the
location of the dog pen and a basketball goal. In response, Rawson erected a ten foot privacy fence along the property line.39 The trial court
found "the nearness of the dog pen to the property line created a nuisance because it was not properly maintained and the sight and smell
40
of dog feces was revolting.

The first step in addressing a nuisance question is to determine
whether the situation qualifies as a private nuisance, a public nuisance,
or both. Standing requirements differ for each type. A public nuisance
is an interference with a right common to the general public. When the
nuisance affects the public at large, a private individual has no standing to bring an action for abatement, unless he suffers damage which is
unusual and peculiar. 41 A private nuisance, however, is anything that
causes inconvenience or damage to, or interferes with, an individual's
use and enjoyment of life or property.4 2 If a plaintiff can establish the
existence of a private nuisance, he will have standing to bring an action
43
for an injunction or damages or both.
The next step in nuisance cases is to decide whether the condition
in question is a nuisance per se or a nuisance per accidens. The traditional test for determining what is a nuisance per se is whether the

38. Id. at 111-12, 370 S.E.2d at 891-92.

39. Id.
40. Id. at 112, 370 S.E.2d at 892.
41. Brown v. Hendricks, 211 S.C. 395, 400-01, 45 S.E.2d 603, 605 (1947). See REOF TORTS §§ 821C, 821E (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; W.

STATEMENT (SECOND)

KEETON, D. DOBBS,

R. KEETON &

D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
AND KEETON].

86, at 618 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER

42. See Strong v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 240 S.C. 244, 253, 125 S.E.2d 628, 632
RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, § at 821D; PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 41, §
87, at 619.

(1962);

43. Brown, 211 S.C. at 401, 45 S.E.2d at 605.
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nuisance has become dangerous at all times and under all circumstances to life, health or property. 4 A nuisance per accidens is an act,
occupation or structure which is not a nuisance per se, but one which
may become a nuisance by reason of its location or the manner in
45
which it is to be conducted.
An allegation of private nuisance necessarily creates a situation in
which the law is required to resolve conflicting rights of landowners.
The difficulty surrounding such a task was well expressed by the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Winget v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.,46 in
which the court stated:
The right of one to make such lawful use of his property as he may
desire must be applied with due regard to the correlative right of the
other to be protected in the reasonable enjoyinent of his property.
The precise limits of each are difficult to define. The problem is striking a balance as nearly as possible between their respective rights.47
The type of relief sought is an important factor in the balancing of
landowners' rights. When a property owner seeks to recover damages
for an alleged nuisance, he must show that the unreasonable use by his
neighbor has caused him harm more significant than slight inconvenience or petty annoyance.' When a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, he
must establish that the defendant's conduct at the place and the time
the injunction is sought is unreasonable. A use is unreasonable when
the gravity of the harm caused outweighs the utility of the conduct or,
"even if the benefits outweigh the harm, if a reasonable person would
conclude that there was a feasible way, economically and scientifically,
to avoid a substantial amount of the harm without material impairment to the benefits."' 9 This determination amounts to an equitable
decision that involves a weighing of the relative hardships and interests
and generally has been regarded as an issue of law.5"
In Blanks the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
that the dog pen at issue was a private nuisance, and that it was not a
nuisance per se. Specifically, it agreed with the trial court's determination that Rawson's dog pen was a nuisance per accidens and that it
44. Suddeth v. Knight, 280 S.C. 540, 545, 314 S.E.2d 11, 14 (Ct. App. 1984).
45. Strong, 240 S.C. at 253, 125 S.E.2d at 632; see Neal v. Darby, 282 S.C. 277, 286,
318 S.E.2d 18, 23 (Ct. App. 1984); 58 ALL JuR. 2D Nuisance § 12 (1971).
46. 242 S.C. 152, 130 S.E.2d 363 (1963).
47. Id. at 159, 130 S.E.2d at 367; see Young v. Brown, 212 S.C. 156, 169-70, 46
S.E.2d 673, 679 (1948) (discussing need for balancing of residential and business rights
and interests).
48. RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, § 821F comment b: PROSSER AND KsTON, supra
note 41, § 88, at 626.
49. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 41, § 88A, at 630-31.
50. See id. § 88A, at 631.
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should be enjoined. 51 The significance of Blanks is that it helps define
a minimum threshold of interference that can be enjoined as a nuisance per accidens. The court of appeals has now established that the
odor and noise from one animal behind a ten foot fence is sufficient to
constitute a nuisance per accidens, and that injunctive relief may be
granted in such cases. The decision is surprising in light of the requirement that both parties' rights be considered, and since one typically
would not imagine an animal's presence to result in such a substantial
interference with a plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his property as
would warrant the issuance of an injunction.
The Blanks decision indicates that the balance of use versus enjoyment weighs heavily against any use that appears unreasonable.
Nonetheless, the court of appeals quoted the following language from
Winget v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.:
[E]very annoyance or disturbance of a landowner from the use made
of property by a neighbor does not constitute a nuisance. The question is not whether the plaintiffs have been annoyed or disturbed...
but whether there has been an injury to their legal rights. People who
live in organized communities must of necessity suffer some inconvenience and annoyance from their neighbors and must admit to annoyances consequent upon the reasonable use of property by others.52
Presumably, the court invoked this language to prevent Blanks
from being given an overly broad reading. Furthermore, the court
seemed to focus its decision, at least in part, on the fact that Rawson's
53
failure to keep the pen clean was not a reasonable use of his property.
The court's emphasis on improper maintenance of the pen illustrates
that when balancing the rights of property owners, a court will give
little weight to an offending use that could be eliminated by reasonable
action. The court stressed the nature of the offending use without regard for the level of interference it created. It never expressly addressed the general question of whether odor and barking from one dog
is sufficient to offend the sensibilities of a reasonable person, and thus
unreasonably deny him the use and enjoyment of his property.
Courts generally have found dogs to be a nuisance when kept in
large numbers, usually in kennels, located in residential areas." Appar-

51. Blanks, 296 S.C. at 113-14, 370 S.E.2d at 893.

52. Id. at 114, 370 S.E.2d at 892-93 (quoting Winget v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 242
S.C. 152, 159, 130 S.E.2d 363, 367 (1963)) (brackets in original).

53. See id. at 114, 370 S.E.2d at 893. The court of appeals did not indicate that the
barking ,of the dog was a factor in its decision to affirm. This fact is noteworthy since it is

easier to prevent a dog pen from smelling than it is to prevent a dog from barking.
54. See, e.g., Miller v. Coleman, 213 Ga. 125, 128, 97 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1957) (noise
and unsanitary conditions produced by 30 to 50 dogs maintained in a kennel located in
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ently only one other court has held that a single dog was capable of
being a nuisance." The Blanks court, however, seemed unconcerned
that the facts of this case required a broad reading of nuisance law to
support a finding that the dog pen constituted a nuisance per accidens.
Instead, the opinion focused on Rawson's unreasonable behavior in
failing to maintain the dog pen in a sanitary condition."' The rule to be
discerned from this case is that when courts balance competing equitable rights of landowners, the more unreasonable the offending use, the
lower the threshold of interference required to constitute a nuisance
for which injunctive relief will be granted.
This rule is consistent with the requirement for an injunction set
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.57 Furthermore, while application of the rule to reach the result in Blanks is questionable, the
rule itself is consistent with the earlier holdings from analogous South
Carolina cases. In Winget, for example, the plaintiff, a resident living
adjacent to a grocery store, alleged that the defendant's store was a
nuisance because it attracted crowds of people and many automobiles
which caused noise, emitted unhealthy fumes, blocked traffic, and generally disturbed the peace and quite of the community. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed an award of damages for the plaintiff,
who had been denied injunctive relief at the trial level. When analyzing
what constituted a nuisance, the court emphasized the fact that the
store was operated in a reasonable manner, rather than focusing on the
level of disturbance imposed on the plaintiff.5 8 The court indicated
that customer traffic, garbage trucks and street sweepers were necessary parts of business activity and did not constitute the basis for a
nuisance5 0

residential area created sufficient interference to enjoin as a private nuisance); Ryan v.
Louisiana Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 62 So. 2d 296, 301-02 (La. Ct. App.
1953) (dog pound operated next to religious convent, capable of handling 50 or more
dogs, was found a nuisance per accidens because of the manner in which it was operated); Roche v. Saint Remain, 51 So. 2d 666, 669-70 (La. Ct. App. 1951) (odor and noise
from a dog kennel capable of maintaining 40 dogs, operated in a residential neighborhood, was found a private nuisance per accidens because it was improperly maintained);
City of Fredericktown v. Osborn, 429 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (operation of
kennel in residential area was enjoined as private nuisance because it housed 30 to 35
dogs).
55. See Davoust v. Mitchell, 146 Ind. App. 536, 257 N.E.2d 332 (1970).
56. See Blanks, 296 S.C. at 114, 370 S.E.2d at 893.
57. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, §§ 821F, 822 comment d. See PROssER AND
KEETON, supra note 41, § 88A, at 631 (issue of injunction involves balancing of equities
and depends on the plaintiff showing the activity in question is unreasonable under the
facts and circumstances).
58. See Winget v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 242 S.C. 152, 161, 130 S.E.2d 363, 368
(1963).
59. See id.
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Allowing garbage to collect and create obnoxious odors, however,
was not considered necessary for business purposes6 0 This use
presented a jury question as to whether it was a nuisance. Thus, the
court again stressed its emphasis on the reasonableness of the use (i.e.
whether the misuse complained of could be avoided with little effort)
versus the level of the interference. By its holding in Winget, the court
demonstrated that when an interference is necessary and unavoidable,
such as the inevitable inconvenience to neighbors of a grocery store, it
will impose a higher threshold for interference required to constitute a
nuisance. But when the use is avoidable and in that sense unreasonable, such as allowing trash to collect and create odors, the Winget court
indicated its willingness to permit a jury to determine the existence of
a private nuisance per accidens, thus implicitly imposing a lower
threshold of interference to the plaintiff. 1
In Lever v. Wilder Mobile Homes, Inc.6 2 the court of appeals affirmed a jury decision that a sewage treatment lagoon, which emitted
offensive odors and leaked sewage into a neighboring landowner's
pond, was a nuisance.6 3 The Lever court did not discuss the balance of
use versus enjoyment, but it expressed disapproval for the activity creating the nuisance. The court stated, "In South Carolina 'anything'
working inconvenience or damage, or interfering with the enjoyment of
life or property is a nuisance. More to the point, it is a nuisance to use
'64
property in such a way that annoying or injurious odors are omitted.
The odors from the sewage prevented the plaintiffs from hosting
family picnics and church groups and interfered with their gardening.
By upholding the jury's finding of a nuisance under these facts, the
court demonstrated its unwillingness to tolerate unreasonable, preventable misuse of property that offends others, even if the interference
does not deprive the plaintiffs of the entire use and enjoyment of their
property. 5
In Young v. Brown6 6 the South Carolina Supreme Court found
that under the facts of that case, locating a cemetery in a residential
area was an unreasonable use of property and could be enjoined as a
private nuisance per accidens. The court's decision focused on the fact

60. See id.
61. See id. at 161-62, 130 S.E.2d at 368.
62. 283 S.C. 452, 322 S.E.2d 692 (Ct. App. 1984).
63. Id. at 452, 322 S.E.2d at 693.
64. Id. at 454, 322 S.E.2d at 693-94 (citation omitted). This language goes beyond
the holding of the supreme court in Winget, in which the court indicated that every
annoyance or disturbance does not constitute a nuisance, and emphasizes the court of
appeals' disapproval of the use involved in the Lever case.
65. See id. at 453-54, 322 S.E.2d at 693-94.
66. 212 S.C. 156, 46 S.E.2d 673 (1948).
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that the cemetery, which tended to depress the cheerful surroundings
common to neighborhoods, could be located in a less populated area,
thus avoiding annoyance to surrounding property owners.6 The court
indicated, however, that if the area had been populated to the extent
that the only location for the cemetery would have been more or less
residential, then the annoyance could not have been avoided and the
plaintiff would not have been entitled to an injunction. 8
Thus, based on Young and other previously discussed South Carolina cases, the holding of the court of appeals in Blanks does not seem
unreasonable. Private nuisance actions seeking injunctive relief are equitable in nature and require the court to balance the competing rights
of landowners.6 9 Furthermore, the Blanks decision is consistent with
Davoust v. Mitchell,7 0 a case with almost identical facts, in which the
Indiana Court of Appeals held that the odor and barking from one dog
was a sufficient interference with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff's property to constitute a private nuisance subject to injunctive
71
relief.
The importance of the holding in Blanks is that it helps identify
situations in which courts may be willing to find a nuisance that can be
enjoined, even though the facts do not appear to cause egregious interference with a plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his property. After
Blanks the odor from even one dog behind a ten foot fence is enough
to satisfy the requirements for an injunction. Moreover, in cases of equity Blanks leaves no doubt that a court properly may consider the
ease with which an offending condition could be prevented.
While the Blanks decision was a proper resolution of the dispute
in that case, the decision should not be given an overly broad reading.
Neither attorneys nor trial courts should read this case as one supporting a finding of a nuisance simply because a condition offends a neighboring landowner and can be easily eliminated. Blanks does not eliminate the requirement that a certain threshold of interference with use
and enjoyment of another's property must be reached before the court
will consider the reasonableness of an offensive condition or activity.
Instead, the case stands for the proposition that one complaining of an
alleged nuisance must meet minimum threshold requirements establishing unreasonable use of property, and that once the requirements

67. See id. at 170-72, 46 S.E.2d at 679-80.
68. See td. at 171-72, 46 S.E.2d at 679-80.
69. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, § 822 comment d;
supra note 41, § 88A, at 630-32.
70. 146 Ind. App. 536, 257 N.E.2d 332 (1970).
71. Id. at 540-41, 257 N.E.2d at 335-38.
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are met, injunctive relief is proper.
Bernard F. Hawkins, Jr.

IV.

RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS PRESUMED TO BE PERSONAL ABSENT
EVIDENCE OF INTENT FOR RESTRICTION TO RUN WITH LAND

In 1988 the South Carolina Court of Appeals considered a restrictive covenant case and handed down a novel ruling. In Charping v.
J.P. Scurry & Co.72 the court affirmed the trial court's decision that
the restrictive covenant at issue in the case was personal to the original
owner/seller, and thus did not run with the land. The court reached
this decision even though the restriction directly affected the use of
land owned by the seller. The court refused to recognize a presumption
that restrictive covenants are intended to benefit land retained by the
seller, despite the plaintiff's assertion that such covenants benefit sellers and subsequent purchasers in their use of retained land. The decision is important to any grantor who seeks to create a benefit for his
land and then transfer the land with the benefit. The decision is also
important because it may rename incidentally a class of restrictive covenants in South Carolina.7 3 Charping is most significant, however, for
its message of caution to attorneys who draft restrictive covenants.
The controversy arose when a property owner divided her land
into two tracts and conveyed each to a different grantee. The first tract
she conveyed consisted of five lots and the second tract consisted of
three. The first tract was deeded with a restriction. The grantee of the
second tract, arguing that he owned benefitted land, sought to enforce
the restriction on the first tract.
Mary Lemon Owens Townsend owned both tracts until 1980, when
she made the first conveyance to Commonwealth, a South Carolina
general partnership. 4 The deed conveying the five lots to Commonwealth contained the following language: "'[T]he above property is to
be developed into a maximum of four (4) residential lots, each of which
is to be used solely for the construction of a single family residence.' "7

72. 296 S.C. 312, 372 S.E.2d 120 (Ct. App. 1988).
73. Formerly, "personal" covenants (those not intended to benefit retained land)
were known as covenants "in gross." 5 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROP-

ERTY 67312] [a] (1989). Charping may be an attempt by the court to clarify an obscure
legal term.
74. In Charping the court of appeals referred to Commonwealth as "the partnership." This survey note will refer to the partnership by its proper name, Commonwealth,
as it appeared in the deed from Townsend. See Deed from Townsend to Commonwealth,
Book D 563, at 825, Register of Mesne Conveyances, Richland County, South Carolina.
75. Charping,296 S.C. at 313, 372 S.E.2d at 121 (quoting Deed from Townsend to
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The deed failed to specify who could enforce the restriction or whether
the restriction was intended to benefit any other tract.
In 1983 Townsend made the second conveyance to the plaintiff,
William P. Charping. Subsequent to that conveyance, in August 1985,
Townsend executed a "Modification of Restriction" for the benefit of
Commonwealth. The modification permitted the first tract to be used
for six residential lots instead of four. In December 1985 the partnership conveyed the first tract to the defendant, J.P. Scurry and Company, which sought to exercise its rights under the modified restriction.
Charping brought this action to enforce the restriction on the first
tract and to enjoin the construction of more than four residences. 6
The issue before the court of appeals was whether the restrictive
covenant was personal or real. A covenant is a promise to do or not to
do something, and a real covenant is a promise relating to the use of
land. If the restriction in this case were deemed a real covenant, then it
would "run with the land." In other words, the restriction could be
enforced by or against assignees of the original parties to the covenant.
If the covenant were deemed personal, then it would be enforceable
only by or against the original parties. 7 7 Charping, the assignee of
Townsend, an original party, sought to have the covenant declared real
because he desired the benefit of the restriction.
Restrictive covenants impose a burden on the estate of the cove-

Commonwealth, supra note 74). The court of appeals noted that when the second tract
was conveyed in 1983 to Charping, no reference was made in his deed to the restriction
on the first tract. Townsend mentioned the restriction to Charping at the closing, but
Charping had no prior knowledge of the restriction. Id. It is unclear why the court mentioned the deed to Charping. Charping's deed cannot enlarge the rights of Townsend or
her assigns, as those rights are determined by the deed from Townsend to Commonwealth. Belue v. Fetner, 251 S.C. 600, 164 S.E.2d 753 (1968). If the restriction was not
intended to run with the land from the Commonwealth deed, it cannot be made to run
by a later deed between other parties. See id. The only logical explanation is that the
court looked to the language of the second deed as evidence of whether Townsend believed the covenant to be real or personal.
76. Charping sought an injunction, an equitable remedy, but argued breach of covenant, While the merger of law and equity has confused the distinction, the traditional
remedy for breach of covenant, an action at law, is monetary damages. 5 R. POWELL & P.
ROHAN, supra note 73, 676 (citing Spencer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (1583)). Why Charping chose not to argue the legal principles required to establish an equitable servitude is
unclear, when that cause of action seems more likely to provide the desired remedy, and
when it could be less difficult to prove. See id. V 676 (citing Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng.
Rep. 1143 (1848)). From a practical standpoint the injunction probably would have been
granted. "The modern union of law and equity, [and] . . . the judicial confusion over
which covenants should run at law and which should run in equity, have caused courts,
in general, to grant the relief they feel is appropriate, without regard to the real or equitable nature of the covenant." Id.
77. See id. 111670[2], 673[1].
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nantor and provide a benefit to the estate of the covenantee. Townsend
received a benefit from the covenant, and Charping sought the benefit
of that covenant as Townsend's assignee. In order for the benefit of a
covenant to extend to the grantor's assignee, the following criteria
must be met:
(1) It must appear that grantor and grantee intended that the covenant should run with the land; (2) it must appear that the covenant is
one "touching" or "concerning" the land with which it runs; (3) it
must appear that there is "privity of estate" between the promisee or
party claiming the benefit of the covenant and the right to enforce it,
and the promisor or party who rests under the burden of the
covenant.7 8
If all three criteria are not present, the covenant cannot be enforced at
law as a real covenant.
Although the court of appeals held the covenant to touch and concern the land, it determined that Townsend's covenant did not run
with the land because the parties' intent had not been proved.79 De-

78. Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248,
255, 15 N.E.2d 793, 795 (1938) (citing C. CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTs RUNNING
WITH THE LAND 74 (1929)). Nesponsit is viewed as an equitable servitude case, unlike
Charping,which is considered a real covenant case.
One of the criteria established in Nesponsit is "privity of estate." "Privity of estate"
is divided into two parts: vertical privity and horizontal privity. See R. POWELL & P.
ROHAN, supra note 73, T673[2]. A third type, mutual privity, also exists in some jurisdictions. See id. Mutual privity, however, is not relevant to the present discussion.
The early English rule required both vertical and horizontal privity for a covenant to
run with the land. Privity is essentially a relationship between the parties interested in a
covenant. See id. 673[2][c]. Privity of estate concerns common interests in land burdened or benefitted by a covenant. Id. Vertical privity exists between an original party to
the covenant and his successor, while horizontal privity "exists when the original parties
make their covenant in connection with the conveyance of an estate in fee from one of
the parties to the other. The covenant and conveyance must be made at the same time,
although no continuing mutual relationship to the affected land is needed." Id. %
673[2][a].
The generally accepted modem view is that only vertical privity is required for a
benefit to run. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 548 (1944). In South Carolina the issue
has not been resolved, but at least one case has been read to suggest (in dicta) that both
vertical and horizontal privity might be required. 5 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note
73, 673[2] [c] (citing Epting v. Lexington Water Power Co., 177 S.C. 308, 181 S.E. 66
(1935)). Until the South Carolina courts address the issue, the correct rule will not be
clear.
Even if South Carolina required both types of privity, Charpingwould satisfy the
requirement since the covenant was made with the conveyance between the original parties and Charping was the successor to the estate of one of those parties.
79. Charping,296 S.C. at 315-16, 372 S.E.2d at 122.
The court may have been assuming that the covenant's burden runs with the land
even if the benefit does not. Although the court did not make this assumption expressly,
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spite Charping's plea, the court refused to presume intent because the
deed contained no evidence that the benefit of the covenant was to
attach to the land retained by the grantor.8 The court of appeals cited
Cheves v. City Council"' to support its requirement of intent.8 2 The
court interpreted Cheves to require that the language of the covenant
evidence an intent that the covenant run with the land. Since the language contained no reference to the remaining land of the grantor or to

her heirs and assigns, the court held that the requisite intent was not
8 3

present.
The early rule from Spencer's Case8 4 required precise language of

intent for a restriction to run with the land. In Cheves the South Carolina Supreme Court implicitly rejected the narrow rule of Spencer's
Case with regard to covenants, stating, "Covenants are to be construed
so as to carry into effect the intention of the parties, which is to be
collected from the whole instrument and from the circumstances surrounding its execution.""5 Despite this language, the court of appeals
in Charpingrelied on Cheves to avoid looking beyond the deed for the

it may be inferred from the fact that the burden currently is being enforced against J.P.
Scurry & Co., the assignee of an original party to the covenant. Because the plaintiff
sought only to enforce the restriction on the alleged benefitted land, the court did not
have to address this issue, which warrants scrutiny.
Intent of the parties, required for the benefit to run, is also required for the burden
to run. 5 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 73, T 673[2][b]. Because the language of the
deed did not mention the heirs and assigns of either the promisee or the promisor, the
covenant should not be construed as running to one but not the other. Despite this paradox, the successors of Commonwealth apparently are bound. The court may be relying
on equitable notions to support its assumption. While personal covenants are only enforceable against the covenantor, and not his successors, the restrictions themselves
often are enforced in equity against a purchaser with notice. See id. T 673[21[d]. J.P.
Scurry was a purchaser with constructive notice since the restriction was in its chain of
title. See id.
80. Charping, 296 S.C. at 315, 372 S.E.2d at 122. When no evidence exists from
which to determine intent, some jurisdictions presume that a benefit is intended to run
with the land. See, e.g., Virgin v. Garrett, 233 Ala. 34, 169 So. 711 (1936); Baker v.
Lunde, 96 Conn. 530, 114 A. 673 (1921); Boll v. Milliken, 31 R.I. 36, 76 A. 789 (1910). By
refusing to adopt such a presumption, South Carolina joins the majority of jurisdictions
which do not presume intent, and which place on the plaintiff the burden of proving
intent by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Lovell v. Columbian Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 294 Mass. 473, 2 N.E.2d 545 (1936); Traficante v. Pope, 115 N.H. 356, 341 A.2d 782
(1975); Olson v. Jantausch, 44 N.J. Super. 380, 130 A.2d 650 (App. Div. 1957); Raintree
Corp. v. Rowe, 38 N.C. App. 664, 248 S.E.2d 904 (1978).
81. 140 S.C. 423, 138 S.E. 867 (1927).
82. See Charping,296 S.C. at 315, 372 S.E.2d at 122.
83. Id.
84. 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (1583) (requiring the words "heirs and assigns").
85. Cheves, 140 S.C. at 429, 138 S.E. at 869 (emphasis added). See also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 544 comment c (1944) (intention that benefit of promise shall run
may be found entirely by inference from circumstances under which promise was made).
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parties' intent. Even under the Cheves "surrounding circumstances"
rule, the existence of unexpressed intent is a question of fact requiring
a subjective determination. 6 Nonetheless, in light of its discussion of
heirs and assigns, the court seems to have employed the old strict language rule.8 7 Whether the court intended to reinforce a strict language
rule is not clear from the opinion.
Notwithstanding South Carolina's unwillingness to abandon feudalistic real property laws, the court of appeals most likely intended
only to require general language of intent, not the actual term "heirs
and assigns." While requiring exact words (i.e. "heirs and assigns") for
a valid conveyance furthers one purpose of property law, it may impede another.
One principle underlying the enforcement of restrictive covenants
is that private land use controls are disfavored, and courts generally
seek to avoid enforcing restrictions when possible.88 The competing
principle is that "magic word" requirements should be discouraged.8 9
With Charping,the court of appeals has threatened to reverse any progress away from strict language requirements, and to insure that South
Carolina remains tied to formalistic requirements.
Several significant questions raised by Charping were not addressed by the court of appeals. For example, it is unclear whether

86. See Annotation, Restrictive Covenant-Who May Enforce, 51 A1.R.3D 556,
578 (1973).
87. See Charping,296 S.C. at 315, 372 S.E.2d at 122.
88. See Sea Pines Plantation Co. v. Wells, 294 S.C. 266, 270, 363 S.E.2d 891, 894
(1987) ("Courts tend to strictly interpret restrictive covenants and resolve any doubt or
ambiguities in a covenant on the presumption of free and unrestricted land use."). The
court in Sea Pines went on to say that "to enforce a restrictive covenant, a party must
show that the restriction applies to the property either by the covenant's express language or by a plain unmistakable implication." Id. (citing Hamilton v. CCM, Inc., 274
S.C. 152, 263 S.E.2d 378 (1980)). Despite courts' reluctance, a covenant will be enforced
in South Carolina when the restriction clearly applies to the property involved. "[A]
restrictive covenant is a voluntary contract between the parties. Courts shall enforce
such covenants unless they are indefinite or contravene public policy." Id. (citing Vickery v. Powell, 267 S.C. 23, 225 S.E.2d 856 (1976)).
89. Early common law language requirements, often referred to as "magic word"
requirements, are disfavored because of the strict penalty they impose on unwitting buyers or sellers of land. At early common law, as is true in South Carolina today, a fee
simple could not be conveyed by such language as "I convey said land to 'John Doe' in
fee simple," or "I convey all my interest in said land to 'John Doe.'" According to the
strict common law rule, the grantor in South Carolina who desires to convey a fee simple
must say "I convey said land to 'John Doe' and his heirs and assigns." See, e.g., McLaurin v. McLaurin, 265 S.C. 149, 152, 217 S.E.2d 41, 42 (1975). Common law language requirements are painfully inflexible, often penalizing parties who are unaware of their
existence, even when the intent of the grantor is unmistakable. They are, therefore,
looked upon with disfavor in most jurisdictions. See, e.g., J. DuKMNmR & J. KRIER,
PROPERTY 365 (1981) (recognizing trend away from formalistic language requirements).
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rights under a personal covenant relating to land can be exercised after
ownership in the related land has been terminated. 90 Theoretically, if
the covenant is personal and does not relate to the land, the rights still
should be exercisable. Practically, this may not be the case.
South Carolina law does not specify the duration of personal covenants made in relation to a particular tract of land. One of the leading
American cases on the subject is Jennings v. Baroff,9' which held that
a personal covenant relating to property ceases to be enforceable when
its maker terminates his interest in the related property.92 Under the
Baroff rule, Townsend's covenant would have been enforceable only as
long as she retained the related property. It thus would have ceased
being enforceable when Townsend conveyed her last parcel to Charping. The consideration paid to Townsend for her "Modification of Restriction" need not have been paid because the restriction at that point
no longer was enforceable as a personal covenant.
Assuming, arguendo, that the covenant survived after Townsend
conveyed all her land, the question remains whether she could and did
assign the personal covenant to Charping. A restrictive covenant is a
contract,9 3 and contract rights generally are assignable.9 4 Whether
Townsend effectively assigned the right, and whether a court would
permit assignment, is less clear. While Townsend did not assign the
personal covenant in any instrument specifically for that purpose, the
general language of the deed to Charping might be read to effect an
assignment.
Townsend conveyed the property to Charping "TOGETHER with

90. A personal covenant made in relation to a tract of land is not the same as a real
covenant. 5 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 73, I 673[1].
91. 104 N.J. Eq. 132, 144 A. 717 (1929).
92. Id. at

._,

144 A. at 718. The court stated:

[W]here ...the covenant was simply a reservation for the personal benefit of
the grantor, he might release it whenever he saw fit, and, if he did not do so
during his lifetime, his death would effect the release when that occurred, as
would also the ending during his lifetime of his interest in the property for
the better enjoyment or disposition of which he reserved his personal right.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Welitoff v. Kohl, 105 N.J. Eq. 181, -, 147 A. 390, 393
(1929) ("[E]xistence of the dominant estate is ordinarily essential to the validity of the
servitude granted, and the destruction of the dominant estate releases the servitude.");
Julian v. Lawton, 240 N.C. 436, 82 S.E.2d 210 (1954) (covenant personal to one party
ends at death of that party); Pagano v. Kramer, 47 Misc. 2d 235, 262 N.Y.S.2d 53 (Sup.
Ct. 1965) (a reservation for the personal benefit of the grantor terminates with his
death), rev'd on other grounds, 25 A.D.2d 887, 270 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1966).
93. Weinstein v. Swartz, 3 N.J. 80, 86, 68 A.2d 865, 867 (1949) (citing Rankin v.
Brown, 142 N.J. Eq. 180, 59 A.2d 645 (Ch. Div. 1948)).
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317 (1979). "A contractual right
can be assigned unless the substitution of a right of the assignee for the right of the
assignor would materially change the duty of the obligor .... Id.
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all and singular, the rights, members, hereditaments and appurtenances to the Premises belonging or in any way incident or appertaining, including but not limited to all improvements of any nature located on the Premises and all easements and rights-of-way
appurtenant to the Premises." ' , If Charping could have shown that the
rights under the restrictive covenant were appurtenances, 9 he also
could have shown that Townsend assigned the personal covenant to
him. Unfortunately, proving the covenant was an appurtenance of the
related land would have established that the covenant was real (i.e.
attached to and running with the land), not personal, a result the court
of appeals had already rejected.
After Cheves, an attorney seeking to create a valid real covenant
in South Carolina would have been justified in believing that specific
reference to "heirs and assigns" was not necessary.9 7 Charping makes
clear, however, that South Carolina does not presume restrictive covenants to be imposed for the benefit of adjacent land. When no evidence
of intent exists, restrictive covenants are presumed to be personal.
Consequently, the prudent practitioner will heed the ruling of Charping and include a reference to heirs and assigns of the grantor (or a
statement that "this is to benefit my retained land") whenever the
98
benefit of a covenant is intended to run with the land.
J. Thornton Kirby
V.

THEORY OF RESULTING TRUST INVOKED TO EXCLUDE OWNERSHIP
OF PROPERTY WHOSE VALUE AS ASSET WOULD PRECLUDE AWARD OF
GOVERNMENT AID

In McDowell v. South CarolinaDepartment of Social Services,99
the court of appeals found that a food stamp applicant who had signed
necessary documents to help her son obtain a car and whose name was

95. Deed from Townsend to Charping, supra note 74.
96. An appurtenance is "[s]omething annexed to another thing more worthy as
principal, and which passes as incident to it ....
" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 94 (5th ed.
1979).
97. Any precise language requirement that previously may have existed was extinguished after Cheves, since the case allowed courts to consider surrounding circumstances. See Cheves v. City Council, 140 S.C. 423, 429, 138 S.E. 867, 869 (1927).
98. Whether the drafter of a deed must use the exact words "heirs and assigns" is
debatable. Because these words clearly will be upheld, even if others will not, cautious
attorneys will choose to employ them. Since the deed in Charping did not mention the

successors to the grantor in any fashion, it is impossible to know with certainty what the
court intended.
99. 296 S.C. 89, 370 S.E.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1987).
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thus jointly listed on the car title, was trustee of a resulting trust in
favor of her son. Based on this finding, the court held that the automobile was not the applicant's asset for purposes of food stamp
eligibility. 00
On her application for food stamps Fannie McDowell (McDowell)
listed two cars. One car was driven by her and the other was driven
and maintained by her son, Kim McDowell (Kim). The Department of
Social Services (DSS) included Kim's vehicle as an asset of McDowell's, which caused her to exceed the maximum resource limit allowed
for food stamp eligibility. McDowell appealed the inclusion of her son's
vehicle as an asset attributable to her to the DSS Fair Hearing Committee.' 01 The Committee upheld the denial of food stamp assistance
and the circuit court dismissed McDowell's appeal of the Committee's
decision. 10 2 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's dismissal
on a theory of resulting trust. 103
The court first examined the rules governing a resulting trust.
When a conveyance is made to one person and the consideration is
paid by a close relative, it is presumed to be a gift. 04 The presumption
is rebuttable, however, and the facts of McDowell effectively rebutted
any presumption that a gift was made to McDowell.'0 5
The court cited in support of its holding Ray v. Norris,0° in which
the North Carolina Court of Appeals held the creation of a resulting
trust depends on the intention of the person furnishing the consideration. 0 7 Since neither McDowell nor her son ever intended the former
to have an interest in the car, a resulting trust was created. 0 8
Finally, the court explained the error in the reasoning of both DSS
and the circuit court. DSS ruled that for a resulting trust to arise, McDowell would have to have taken title solely in her name. 0 9 The court
of appeals found this position unsupported by law" 0 and held that the
circuit court erred in finding the Committee's decision was not clearly
an error of law."'
The trust imposed in McDowell actually was a purchase-money re-

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 91, 370 S.E.2d at 879-80.
Id.
Id. at 90-91, 370 S.E.2d at 879.
Id. at 91, 93, 370 S.E.2d at 879, 880.
See id. at 92, 370 S.E.2d at 880.
Id.
78 N.C. App. 379, 337 S.E.2d 137 (1985).
Id. at 386, 337 S.E.2d at 140.
McDoweU, 296 S.C. at 92, 370 S.E.2d at 880.
Id. at 93, 370 S.E.2d at 880.
Id. (citing Ex parte Stokes, 256 S.C. 260, 182 S.E.2d 306 (1971)).
Id.
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suilting trust.' A purchase-money resulting trust arises by operation
of law when "one person pays the purchase price for property and
causes title to the property to be taken in the name of another who is
not a natural object of the bounty of the purchaser." 3
In McDowell the proponent of the resulting trust urged that it be
imposed in order to exclude the property from her assets. In the cases
on which the court relied, however, the proponents of the trust sought
to acquire, not exclude, the property." 4 The cases relied upon by the
court of appeals illustrate the more usual situation in which a resulting
trust is invoked. Nonetheless, the McDowell court broadened the scope
of application for resulting trusts and, therefore, the theory likely will
be invoked more frequently after this case to exclude, as well as include, property whose ownership is at issue.
Kristen English Robinson

VI..

MORE THAN PURELY ECONOMIC BENEFIT REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH
OVERRIDING PUBLIC INTEREST FOR COASTAL DEVELOPMENT

The state supreme court in South Carolina Wildlife Federation v.
South Carolina Coastal Council"" held that "evidence of purely economic benefit [to the public] is insufficient as a matter of law to establish an overriding public interest.""' Thus, the court stated that one
seeking a permit for coastal development must show more than economic benefit to satisfy the requirement that the project be one of
overriding public interest.'"
In South Carolina Wildlife Federationthe developer, LitchfieldBy-The-Sea, sought a permit to allow dredging in fresh water wetlands.
Canal dredging was necessary for the creation of waterfront residential
lots and access to the Waccamaw River."" Bef6re a developer may receive such a permit, the following three conditions must exist: "(1) no

112. See id. at 92, 370 S.E.2d at 880.
113. See J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHNSON, WILLS, TRUSTS,
1984).
114. See Ray v. Norris, 78 N.C. App. 379, 337 S.E.2d 137
N.C. App. 588, 315 S.E.2d 759, afl'd, 312 N.C. 324, 321 S.E.2d
291 S.C. 525, 354 S.E.2d 559 (1987); Ex parte Stokes, 256

AND ESTATES 476 (3d

ed.

(1985); Collins v. Davis, 68
892 (1984); Lollis v. Louis,
S.C. 260, 182 S.E.2d 306

(1971).
115. 296 S.C. 187, 371 S.E.2d 521 (1988).

116. Id. at 190, 371 S.E.2d at 523.
117. Id. at 189-90, 371 S.E.2d at 522.
118. The dredging of approximately one mile of canal was to provide twenty-two
waterfront lots. More than sixty acres of wetlands would be affected by the dredging.
Record at 72.
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feasible alternatives or an overriding public interest; and (2) minimization of environmental damage; and (3) no significant environmental
impact."1 10 Upon examining the record, the court found no "evidence
of an overriding public interest in the permanent alteration of [the
'120
targeted] wetlands.
Litchfield attempted to show an overriding public interest through
an experts report projecting speculative economic benefits from the
project. 21 The court reasoned that evidence of purely economic benefit
is inconsistent with the purpose of the Coastal Management Program
to guide the wise preservation and use of coastal resources."' This
finding led the court to hold that evidence of purely economic benefit
12 3
alone will not establish an overriding public interest.
Although the court did not cite the South Carolina Coastal Council Regulations12 in support of its holding, the court apparently
adopted the notion of public interest as stated in regulation 301(C)(13). 125 This regulation provides that economic benefit is a factor
to be balanced against conservation interests to determine public interest."20 South Carolina Code section 48-39-150(A)(7)1 27 also requires a
balancing of these interests."28 By its use of the term "purely," the

court seemingly intended to qualify its holding and imply that economic benefit coupled with something more may establish overriding
public interest.
A contrary interpretation is that public interest is defined as conservation, thereby excluding economic benefit from the analysis. This
interpretation would have to be based on the court's statement that
"evidence of purely economic benefit . . . does not support the stated
purpose of the Coastal Management Program to protect, restore, or en119. South Carolina Wildlife Fed'n, 296 S.C. at 189, 371 S.E.2d at 522.
120. Id. at 190, 371 S.E.2d at 522.
121. Id. Benefits included potential local tax revenues of $6 million and the creation
of 3,500 jobs in Georgetown County. Record at 50.
122. See South Carolina Wildlife Fed'n, 296 S.C. at 190, 371 S.E.2d at 523 (citing
S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-30(B)(1) to (2) (Law. Co-op. 1987)).
123. See id.
124. S.C. CODE REGS. 30-1 to -13 (1976).
125. See S.C. COD REGs. 30-1(C)(13) (1976). The regulation reads:
(Plublic interest refers to the beneficial and adverse impacts and effects of a
project upon members of the general public, especially residents of South Carolina who are not the owners and/or developers of the project. To the extent
that, in the opinion of the Council, the value of such public benefits is greater
than the public costs embodied in adverse environmental, economic and fiscal
effects, a proposed project may be credited with net public benefits.

Id.
126. See id.
127. S.C. CODE
128. See id.

ANN.

§ 48-39-150(A)(7) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
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hance the resources of the State's coastal zone.. . . This public inter12
est must counterbalance the goal of economic improvement.'
Though possible, such an interpretation is unlikely to be espoused,
since it would represent a major break from the notion of public interest evidenced in the Code, Program, and Regulations.
Prior to South Carolina Wildlife Federationthe court had offered
no guidance for the interpretation of overriding public interest. In
State v. South Carolina Coastal Council"0 the court overturned a permit upon finding no overriding public interest in a proposal to impound 660 acres of marshland for the establishment of leasable duck
blinds and aquaculture. In that case, however, the court did not elaborate on its conclusion concerning overriding public interest. The court
in South Carolina Wildlife Federationprovides the guidance it failed
to give in South Carolina Coastal Council.
While the court in South Carolina Wildlife Federationmay have
shed a flicker of light on overriding public interest, it did not illuminate completely the contours of this concept. Nonetheless, the case is
valuable for its one clear rule: something more than economic benefit
must be shown to establish an overriding public interest.
Richard C. Webb

129. South Carolina Wildlife Fed'n, 296 S.C. at 190, 371 S.E.2d at 523 (emphasis
added).
130. 289 S.C. 445, 346 S.E.2d 716 (1986).
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